The dean of automotive reporting, Paul Ingrassia, published a terrific interview with Alan Mulally, CEO of Ford Motor Company, in Saturday’s Wall Street Journal. Citing Ford’s $2.7 billion 2009 profit, and the fact that it was the only U.S. automaker not to duck into bankruptcy, Ingrassia noted how Ford might even surpass GM in market share for the first time in more than eighty years.

In When Growth Stalls, I document how struggling companies tend to keep themselves down through a combination of a loss of focus, a loss of nerve, a lack of management consensus and marketing inconsistency. I found it interesting that in Ingrassia’s analysis he inadvertently referenced how Mulally has dealt with three of these issues:

Loss of Focus: “[Mulally's] method has been to simplify, relentlessly and systematically, a business that had grown way too complicated and costly to be managed effectively. ’Improve Focus, Simplify Operations,’ reads one of Mr. Mulally’s many charts, which he repeats like a sacred mantra. Soon after his arrival Ford began shedding brands—Jaguar, Land Rover and Aston Martin among them—that the company couldn’t afford to support. Volvo will be next to go.”

Loss of Nerve: “The core Ford brand got an investment infusion to replace aging cars and revive a model lineup that had been heavily tilted toward gas-guzzling trucks.”

Lack of Consensus: “Mr. Mulally has overhauled the often-contentious culture in Ford’s executive suite. Most of his appointees are company veterans, but they’re the sort of people who typically got overlooked when style seemed to count more than substance, as it often did at Ford…Internal surveys show 87% of Ford employees believe the company is on the right track.”

Mulally summed up his recent success with a simple statement: ”It’s all about producing products people want.” That may be true of every company, but too few get it done–especially in the American automotive industry. I, for one, hope Ford’s comeback is a lasting one.

The big news this week in Medialand is NBC’s decision to cancel The Jay Leno Show and move the eponymous comedian back to a late-night time slot. About the short-lived experiment, Jeff Gaspin, NBC Universal’s Chairman of Television Entertainment, said, “I don’t think it’s wrong to take chances…Sometimes they work. Sometimes they don’t.”

Fair enough. But with a little more imagination, NBC might have been able to predict the outcome. The much-hyped decision to launch The Jay Leno Show was made in part based on economics—it’s a whole lot cheaper to produce an hour of live TV than an episode of Law & Order. While the show was profitable for NBC, it’s not terribly surprising that it would lag its competition in the ratings—especially in its first season, when loyal viewers of competitive offerings were caught up in current storylines.

The Jay Leno Show’s low ratings created a “lead-in” problem for NBC affiliates, who rely on audience carryover to provide viewers for their late local news. Michael Fiorile, chairman of NBC’s affiliate board, said NBC’s Leno strategy “has been devastating for a number of late newscasts around the country.”

While that’s unfortunate, it also underscores an unhealthy dependency that too often blinds local news providers to their task. And it provides a valuable business lesson for us all.

Most people tend to think of the television industry as something “other” than the product and service sectors that comprise the rest of the economy. But in reality it’s no different. Television news is a “product” that consumers “buy” (we pay for free TV with our time), and competitors are called to offer their prospective customers an experience that is unique, relevant, and valuable, just like any other business.

When a local affiliate complains about the network not offering a good enough lead-in for its local news, it’s like McDonald’s complaining that the Burger King across the street has better access to traffic. While that may be true, it can also serve as an all-too convenient cop-out. McDonald’s job is not to complain about the way the street is designed, but to get people to cross it–by offering something intriguing and unique (a task the company has performed quite well in recent years).

That’s where TV news falls down. Local news directors too often live in a “be better” bubble. That causes them to overstate the impact of their slogans, overvalue being first on the scene of an accident, and overpromote their handsome/pretty/ smart/honest/capable/talented/sincere news anchors. If they instead applied their intelligence and intensity (the news directors I’ve met have both in abundance) to seeking new ways to truly differentiate their offerings from the competition, we could see some real innovation in how local news is delivered. I suspect most viewers—and most people in the industry—would agree that there’s plenty of room for improvement.

Jay Leno is proven product whose success is in part dependent on how well he’s packaged and distributed. Local news is no different, and as Gaspin said, it’s not wrong to take chances. If only more news directors would.

As 2009 draws to a close, I have bad news and I have good news.

First the bad news. According to the Wall Street Journal, stock performance in the decade now ending is the worst ever–worse even than the woeful 1930s. For the past ten years, the value of NYSE-traded stocks has declined by an average of 0.5 percent a year. Compare that to the 1990s, when the average annual increase was an incredible 17.6 percent.

Factor in inflation and it gets even more depressing, with the S&P; 500 declining an inflation-adjusted 3.3 percent annually. During the 1930s, stocks showed an inflation- (deflation, really) adjusted annual gain of 1.8 percent. And the decade now ending saw many notable companies fall out of the S&P; 500, for reasons of scandal (Countrywide, Enron), excess (Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Wachovia), misfortune (Circuit City, Lucent, Reebok) and just plain changing dynamics (AT&T, Compaq, Dow Jones & Co., Maytag, Wyeth).

Pretty discouraging, when you think about it. But here’s the good news. The vast majority of American corporations found a way to move ahead during the turbulent ten years past, and all of them–all of us–are the stronger for it. We face challenges ahead, but having muddled through the most difficult decade in two centuries we’ll face little that will surprise us. And those of us who have maintained our focus, kept our nerve and remained consistent throughout should profit all the more.

Here’s to 2010, the dawn of a new decade. May the old one rest in peace.

[Note: Today marks the one-year anniversary of this blog. Prior to launching it last December I wondered--and worried--if I would have enough to write about. If there's any silver lining to the year now past, it's that it provided plenty of content for a blog called "When Growth Stalls." Let's hope next year is a little tougher on me.]

“Most of the world seems to be focused on the Americans who are unemployed. We’re focused on the 90% that are still employed.”

Those are the words of Ron Shaich, CEO of Panera Bread, the 1,300-unit bakery-cafe that has found a way to thrive in spite of the recession. Its formula? A combination of smart financial management and keen understanding of its core customers, most of whom remain gainfully employed (and ever-more attuned to good value).

Rather than cutting corners, Panera has focused on offering more to its broad range of middle income customers, including free wi-fi access and frequent new menu offerings. “In many ways, we’re renting space to people and the food is the price of admission,” said Shaich. Panera COO Rick Vanzura agrees, saying, “A bunch of folks have been cutting quality to cut price to go after the marginal customer. We said a better strategy that addresses a bigger group of people is providing better value.”

The strategy is working. In 2008 (a very bad year for most fast-casual restaurants), Panera Bread grew by double digits. In 2009–the worst economic year in generations–the company managed to keep same store sales from declining, and in the third quarter actually increased them by 3 percent. Food industry analyst Darren Tristano pinpoints why: “Panera’s on-trend with what consumers are asking for: fresh, customizable, convenient, won’t break the bank.”

Panera Bread has been able maintain its focus because of careful cash management. Rather than using debt to expand, assuming the good times of years past would keep on rolling, the company grew slowly and deliberately over the past decade. That kept it healthy from a cash flow perspective and prevented it from having to cut corners or cut margins (or both) when times got tough. As Shaich says, “Every chain is cutting something — portion size, quality, hours of labor. The result is that ultimately the customer feels it.”

Most players in the restaurant industry—in most industries, for that matter—think the current game is all about price. Panera Bread is an all-too rare exception, demonstrating that companies that keep their focus, nerve, consensus and consistency can thrive even in bad times. I’m a fan.

Earlier this year I commented on a decision by Panasonic to rein in R&D; investment in flat-panel televisions and instead expand its reach into the entry-level market (see “Is Panasonic Kissing Its Future Goodbye?”).

The company appeared to be eyeing significant market share opportunities offered up by the 2009 conversion to digital TV in the U.S. It was a bold move, because while it’s easy to cash in your brand equity and go down-market, once the decision is made it’s nearly impossible to reverse course.

Last month another famous brand made that fateful choice. Liz Claiborne, Inc. agreed to license its namesake brand exclusively to J.C. Penney, ending decades-long relationships with department stores like Macy’s, Dillard’s and Bon-Ton. The Claiborne brand has long been in decline, and a Macy’s spokesperson said the retailer could no longer justify expanding the line because of customer confusion between it and the “Liz & Co.” sub-brand that was being sold exclusively at–you guessed it–J.C. Penney.

The Claiborne brain trust may have created their own problem by overextending the brand, a common manifestation of the loss of focus that afflicts many stalled companies. That said, this new decision may work out. It’s not the first time J.C. Penney has partnered with respected, high-profile designers (Polo Ralph Lauren and Nicole Miller, to name two), and Penney is doing better than many of its rivals in this tough economy.

As with Panasonic’s decision, however, this one will be interesting to watch, and will serve as yet another object lesson for any company struggling with stalled growth. Going downscale–where all the value-conscious buyers are these days–can be extremely tempting. But if you do it, make sure you’re extremely comfortable with your decision. There’s no turning back.

It’s a classic When Growth Stalls scenario: start with a fast-growing and profitable company; add an aggressive new competitor that begins to successfully woo the same customers; watch as the previously flourishing company loses its nerve, its focus, and its consistency, leading to languishing sales and lackluster results.

When Gap, Inc. launched Old Navy in 1993, the spare retail chain sporting affordable merchandise and wacky ads was an immediate hit. Rather than risk losing focus at brand Gap (which was near its zenith atop the retail world), parent company Gap, Inc. used Old Navy as a counterforce to the big discount stores that were trying to ride on Gap’s fashion coattails by ripping off its designs.

Within four years Old Navy sailed past the billion-dollar revenue mark, accounting for nearly half of Gap, Inc.’s top line and some 40 percent of its profits. Offbeat commercials featuring has-been celebrities made the chain the talk of the retail industry, as well of teens and young families that comprised its core market.

Enter H&M;, the trendy Swedish retailer, which opened its first U.S. store in 2000 offering discount apparel with a more fashionable edge. Fearing that H&M;’s success marked a sea change in the industry, Old Navy shifted its focus from the basics to more trendy, upscale merchandise. It didn’t work. Sales fell by more than a billion dollars between 2006 and 2008, with last year’s same store sales sinking an incredible 17 percent.

It was then that Gap, Inc. decided to do something about it. As the Wall Street Journal put it, “Returning Old Navy to its roots was the central theme of Gap’s remaking of the brand.” The Journal quoted Old Navy’s interim president, Tom Wyatt, as he reflected on the brand’s original recipe: “We got tired of it. The customer never did.”

Eighteen months ago Old Navy recommitted to its original focus and began redesigning more than a thousand stores, hoping to leverage consumers’ renewed frugality in this toughest of tough economies. Year-to-date 2009 revenue is up 1 percent, due largely to a third quarter same store sales increase of a healthy 10 percent (the first rise in five long years). Pardon the pun, but Old Navy seems to have righted its ship.

There’s no guarantee that, having returned to its former course, Old Navy can count on smooth sailing. The retail industry is too dynamic to let any successful company alone. But Old Navy’s experience is one more point of evidence that when even the most successful concept runs into a rough economy, a tough competitor, or some other external threat, destructive internal dynamics can turn it into its own worst enemy.

Not a day goes by without more news about Detroit’s beleaguered automakers. While each new development is notable in and of itself, I find it more telling to take a few steps back and look at the big picture.

Below are a few clips from selected Wall Street Journal articles I’ve run across over just the last few days. Take a minute and scroll through them. They tell a fascinating tale.

First, GM continues its inability to focus, revealing a growing lack of consensus between management and the board:

“In a dramatic change of course, General Motors Co. backed out of a deal to sell the company’s European operations to car-parts supplier Magna International Inc., and now plans to spend billions to restructure the money-losing business itself.”

“The decision…was made at a board meeting Tuesday in which the company’s directors strayed from the plan of Chief Executive Frederick “Fritz” Henderson, who had spent months negotiating the Magna agreement.”

“The Opel deal is the second major transaction to fall apart for Mr. Henderson in little over a month.”

“Whereas Mr. Henderson’s predecessor, Rick Wagoner, had often won in the boardroom by relying on the support of long-serving directors, Mr. Henderson appears to be tiptoeing through land mines of strong opinions by adjusting his game plan.”

“Carl-Peter Forster, who worked for GM for more than nine years, is quitting as chief executive of GM Europe. The decision follows a vote by the company’s board of directors on Tuesday to scrap a plan to sell control of the German Opel unit…”

“Despite his dissent of late, Mr. Forster was long viewed as a strong asset on GM’s executive roster and his departure serves another blow to Mr. Henderson, who has seen his management bench shorten since the company’s exit from bankruptcy.”

Across town, Chrysler is making fairy-tale sales and market share predictions to try to convince investors (that means you, taxpayer) that it will repay the $9 billion it owes us by 2014:

“The company said it is counting on a slew of new models to spark a surge in sales over the next five years and drive its revival.”

“Chrysler—which has seen its sales plunge by half in the last few years—predicted revenue will rise about 20% a year, from $42.5 billion in 2010 to $67.5 billion in 2014, and said it would break even in 2011.”

“To hit its financial targets, Chrysler expects to double its world-wide sales, from 1.3 million cars and trucks in 2009 to 2.8 million in 2014, and predicted its U.S. market share will rise from about 6% in 2009 to 11% in 2014.”

Meanwhile, Detroit’s only private automotive company, Ford, has gone about regaining its focus, finding its nerve and sticking to its game plan.

“Last week Consumer Reports gave the company quality ratings comparable to those of Honda and Toyota.”

“On Monday, Ford reported its second consecutive quarterly profit—and more impressively, a swing from a $7.7 billion cash burn a year earlier to positive cash flow of $1.3 billion in the just-ended third quarter…”

“The company gained a percentage of market share in the first 10 months of this year, no easy feat in an ultra-competitive market.”

“The company’s turnaround actually began three years ago with decisions that amounted to zagging every time that General Motors zigged, which was remarkable for a company whose strategy for decades was to follow GM.”

“While GM kept its unwieldy assortment of eight brands, Ford sold Jaguar and Land Rover, cutting its brand lineup down to a manageable size.”

“What’s more, shedding brands and shunning the mortgage business has helped Ford focus on quality, where it had slipped badly early in this decade.”

“Consumer Reports said last week that 90% of Fords, Mercurys and Lincolns rate average or better in quality, right up there with Honda and Toyota.”

“When the economy recovers and car sales increase, Ford could be in great shape.”

The automotive business is complex, but it doesn’t have to be that hard. Focus, nerve, consistency, consensus—no matter the industry, all tend to diminish when growth stalls. And all are essential to getting it back.

At the moment, Ford is the only one of the Big 3 to be paying attention.

If you’ve read When Growth Stalls, you understand the internal dynamics that tend to keep struggling companies down: Lack of consensus among the management team, loss of focus in the marketplace, loss of nerve (usually evidenced by how a company invests–or refrains from investing–its resources), and inconsistency.

I long ago ceased to be amazed when I saw struggling companies dealing with two, three, or even all four of these issues, as they tend to feed off one another. What still amazes me, however, is when more than one of these destructive dynamics rears its head within a single, 750-word newspaper story.

The Wall Street Journal’s October 12 column about Carrefour, the world’s second largest retailer, is a case in point. The Journal’s Ellen Byron and Christina Passariello interviewed new Carrefour CEO Lars Olofsson about the current state of affairs at the company, and published selected excerpts. Here are a few of my own excerpts from his answers (emphasis added):

“If Carrefour had some difficulties in the last 10 years or so, it is because they lost focus on the consumer.”

“Carrefour wasn’t consistent in the execution of its strategy.”

“There has been this ambiguity between going for the bottom line or for the top line, and that means the whole organization hasn’t been aligned in one clear direction.”

Three-for-four in less than a thousand words is pretty amazing, and I suspect if they would have published the full interview evidence of a loss of nerve would have also been apparent. After all, Carrefour brought Olofsson into the stumbling company in January, presenting him with (as the Journal put it) “one of the most difficult assignments in the industry.”

Carrefour has some 15,000 stores around the world and a leadership team that is second to none. But no company is exempt from the forces that plague management when growth stalls–not Olofsson’s, not mine, and not yours. The key is to stare them down and fight them off. As you do, you can get back to business.

I love reading the newspaper. I like the feel of the broadsheet in my hand, the anticipation of turning each page to see what’s next, and the sense I get of being plugged into the world through the rhythm of daily reading. I am a newspaper loyalist, and I’m an endangered species.

That, of course, is not news. Newspapers are shrinking and their circulation shriveling, like a mirror reflecting the Internet’s growth and expansion. Politicians and pundits (including many newspaper editors and publishers) who aren’t schooled in business don’t recognize the absolute and inescapable law of creative destruction. They wring their hands as if what’s happening is a tragic thing. I see it simply as the way of the world.

To a news consumer, the Internet offers many advantages over ink and paper, from timeliness to portability, affordability to dialogue. And for a generation of readers spawned in the wake of the Web, getting their news online is not only better than in print, it’s more natural. Even old guys like me who love the sound of the thump on the driveway in the morning increasingly turn to our Macs and Blackberrys to keep up with breaking events.

But while the Internet is rapidly replacing ink, paper and newsstands, the Web is to news as an aluminum can is to Coke—a terrific way to deliver the product but not the source of its value. Newspapers are struggling because newspapers are confused—they forgot they were in the business of building an audience and focused instead on selling the audience (to the advertisers who increasingly bore their cost of operating). That was fine as long as they had a monopoly on distribution, but it led them to spend their limited resources on adding more ink colors rather than more color to their ink. Now that advertisers have (ultimately) infinitely more choices, newspapers are stuck.

But the answer isn’t so difficult. The key to the future of the newspaper industry lies in its past. There will always be a market for news, and newspapers still have core competencies in gathering, reporting and interpreting what’s important to their readers. If they do their job well, they’ll continue to be able to provide the exclusive content for which readers will pay, regardless of whether or not it results in ink-stained fingers.

The more the newspaper industry focuses on “news” rather than “paper,” the better off it (and we) will be. That will enable it to embrace evolving distribution opportunities and find new sources of revenue and competitive advantage. Just like every other industry must do.

I’ve kept my eye on Sara Lee for several years now, originally because the company was a poster child of the Loss of Focus principle. But in 2005 new CEO Brenda Barnes introduced a plan to streamline Sara Lee, which analysts would have described as a conglomerate but could more accurately have been characterized a beast.

Launched in 1939 as C.D. Kenny Company, over the course of the next sixty-plus years the organization acquired and divested brands in industries as varied as supermarkets (Piggly Wiggly), electronics (Electrolux), apparel (Aris Isotoner, Hanes, Champion, Playtex), shoe polish (Kiwi), and even chemicals (Oxford Chemical Corporation). It took its present name from a company acquired in 1956, The Kitchens of Sara Lee.

By the early 2000s Sara Lee’s strategic chickens had come home to roost in the form of slow sales growth and weak earnings. A company that had fueled growth for decades through artificial diversification had simply become too unwieldy to manage.

That’s when Barnes launched (according to internal company documents) “a bold and ambitious multi-year plan to transform Sara Lee” by divesting brands comprising 40 percent of its revenues and focusing R&D; efforts on food. By 2007 Sara Lee was increasing market share faster than any of its major competitors, and last month Barnes announced that she was selling Sara Lee’s deodorant and skin care brands to Unilever. When asked about the rationale behind this recent move, Barnes—no doubt for the umpteenth time over the past four years–said, “Our intent is to build a great business in food and beverage.” (It was a “multi-year plan,” remember?)

Count me a fan. Contrary to the strategic flailing about demonstrated by many companies when they encounter rough waters, Sara Lee has kept its focus. Barnes has consistently executed on her now four year-old strategic plan, and the nearly $2 billion take she’ll get from the sale to Unilever will equip her to further strengthen Sara Lee’s food and beverage brands. Which will leave a good taste in the mouth of the company’s investors. Smart.