Thursday, April 1, 2010

Same Song, Second Verse?

Dell’s small-and-medium-business division grew by ten percent in the fourth quarter. Its operating profit increased 17 percent. That’s good news, isn’t it?

Maybe not.

You see, Dell has begun offering sweet lease deals and easy financing terms to its small business customers, including interest free loans for purchases over $25,000 and, in some cases, free computers. The company now finances 22 percent of its sales to small and medium businesses, nearly a third more than it did two years ago.  Dell Vice President Erik Dithmer recently admitted, “The percentage of our customers using our credit facilities is increasing much faster than our base business.”

Last I checked, the economy was still fragile and small businesses were living hand-to-mouth. Many will continue to struggle for some time, making Dell’s financing strategy a risky move. According to the Wall Street Journal, Dell increased its reserves to cover potential defaults, and to help minimize the risk the company “brought in long-time small-business customers to train Dell salespeople to understand a small-business balance sheet.” I hope so.

What scares me is that Dell’s strategy is eerily similar to a fatal mistake made by once high-flying Lucent Technologies during the last recession.

Spun off from AT&T in 1996, Lucent seemed like a can’t-lose proposition, and for several years it was. The company occupied a sweet spot within the new economy, manufacturing a variety of products for the telecommunications industry. Lucent generated 1999 revenue of nearly $40 billion, employed 151,000 people, and boasted a market capitalization of a quarter of a trillion dollars as its stock traded as high as $84 per share.

But just four years later, Lucent’s revenue had fallen by 75 percent, more than 100,000 of its employees were gone, and it had lost 95 percent of its market cap. The company’s stock price dropped to as low at 55 cents. The dot-com bust had shut down Lucent’s fountain of growth, a problem magnified by heavy discounts and risky financing terms that the company had been providing its customers to meet aggressive sales targets. Lucent was so highly leveraged that when the recession hit, it had nowhere to turn.  Reflecting on that difficult time, then-Chief Financial Officer Frank D’Amello said, “We went from what was the perfect market to the perfect storm.”

Let’s hope Dell isn’t making that same mistake. To be sure, the company is going into this with its eyes open, and it may have enough safeguards in place to prevent the worst from happening. Still, by offering credit-challenged customers discounted loans to buy depreciating products, Dell is risking its business at both ends. There’s got to be a better way.

Tuesday, August 18, 2009

Two Heads Are Not Better Than One

“The chief executive as visionary leader is a thing of the past.”

That’s the revealed wisdom from Drs. Philip Tulimieri and Moshe Banai, management professors at the Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, City University of New York.

In a recent Wall Street Journal opinion piece, the two professors proclaimed, “It’s time to make room at the top for co-equals: leadership by the CEO and the chief financial officer—with equal authority and accountability.” The reason, they say, is because “the top job has simply become too large, too complex and too demanding for one person.” Tulimieri and Banai believe that the CEO and CFO are now “necessary counterforces” in the “new-millennium corporation” which is focused on “ethical behavior, sustainability and true stakeholder value.” They go on to claim that corporate management is fundamentally changing because young managers are being raised on “principles of mutual respect and corporate pluralism.” Ah, yes (to quote Ron Alsop), the trophy kids grow up.

Pardon me for saying so, but this is a bunch of hooey. Beyond their simplistic inference that “old-millennium” corporations are, by definition, unethical, unsustainable and neglectful of their stakeholders, Tulimieri and Banai paint a simplistic picture of corporate leadership. They make a cliched characterization of the CEO as “eternal optimist pushing ahead at full speed,” while the CFO is a “realist, urging caution and remaining wary of risk.” This horrendous oversimplification is an insult to CEOs and CFOs alike, and leaves the chief operating and chief marketing officers out of the picture altogether.

As a student of the dynamics that fuel and hinder growth, I understand the flaws of the autocratic CEO and the need for strategic consensus-building. But management by committee–even a committee of two–is never a good idea. Tulimieri and Banai recognize that under their model, “inevitable differences on strategy, growth and other issues will make timely decision-making impossible.” But they brush that aside, claiming that when conflicts arise “appeals” can be made to “a higher or independent authority” such as the board or–their word, not mine–a “subcommittee.”

My research demonstrates that lack of strategic consensus is a stumbling block over which many companies trip, often without realizing it. Far from improving the corporation, the structural changes proposed by Tulimieri and Banai would further institutionalize conflict, freeze out key corporate influences, and introduce unnecessary power struggles. While there are two ends to every conference table, the buck can only stop at one of them.

I’ve heard it said that government should be run more like a business, but never that business should be run more like government. I guess the times, they really are a-changin’.

Friday, July 10, 2009

A Risky Tune at Martin Guitar

The Wall Street Journal recently ran a feature about C.F. Martin & Co., the storied guitar maker based in Nazareth, PA. It seems Martin is responding to the slack in demand for discretionary products like premium guitars by manufacturing a solid-wood model for under $900 (compared to the normal price of $2,000 – $3,000). Chris Martin, the company’s CEO, admits, “We needed something so we wouldn’t have to start laying people off.”

On that score the new guitar can already be called a success. Launched in April, over 8,000 copies of the instrument have been sold. One grateful music store owner said, “It was really smart of Martin to come out with these in the current economy. They seem to be filling the niche quite well.” No doubt they have.

While the new guitar is clearly a hit, I have to wonder what long term impact its launch is going to have on the Martin brand. It’s always easy for a premium brand to grab a quick handful of market share by going downmarket, but it’s often a mistake (Mercedes is a prime example, the case for which I make in When Growth Stalls). As the music store owner above went on to say about the new guitars, “Soundwise, for the money, they’re very good, but aren’t necessarily comparable with the more expensive models.”

There’s the rub. While longtime brand loyalists may be somewhat forgiving of Martin for its move to cope with the downturn, other (especially younger) guitar aficionados won’t have the same context and may think of the Martin brand in lesser terms than they normally would. Especially when competitors like Taylor are determined to maintain their quality and price points. It could change the perceptual playing field for some time.

Martin does already offer some cheaper, laminated guitars, which may soften the effects of this decision. And Chris Martin hearkens back to a similar strategy his great-grandfather pursued during the Depression (building guitars for tens of dollars rather than hundreds) as evidence that this was the right move. But the brand landscape in the early 1930s was nowhere near what it is today, nor was the level of consumer sophistication. It’s a different game now, and there’s no guarantee that the rules haven’t changed.

I hope Martin not only survives, but thrives, as it’s a legendary brand. I just wonder if the company considered the potential unintended consequences. And whether it will be able to cope with them as economy–and the guitar industry–shakes out.

Thursday, April 23, 2009

Will 1 Out Of 4 Companies Fail?

Tuesday, April 7, 2009

“Newspaper Business” Is Not an Oxymoron

In the wake of the wakes for the Rocky Mountain News and Seattle Post-Intelligencer, newspapers may finally be awakening to the fact that for too long they’ve been in the railroad business while a host of new transportation options have sprung up around them.

Newspapers do have a number of unique advantages–local newsrooms, longstanding reputations, deep-rooted community contacts–but as long as they insist on an outmoded distribution model they’re going to continue to shrink.

That said, their task is not as easy as simply porting their cargo over to a different vehicle (namely, the web). It will take repackaging, refreshing and rethinking exactly what “product” they provide, and to whom. That’s why I found comments made by the Wall Street Journal’s L. Gordon Crovitz so refreshing. He says, “For years, publishers and editors have asked the wrong question: Will people pay to access my newspaper content on the Web? The right question is: What kind of journalism can my staff produce that is different and valuable enough that people will pay for it online?”

For too long the Fourth Estate has thought itself immune to the laws of commerce. Alas, as the newspapers above (and the New York Times, the Boston Globe, and dozens of others) are discovering, people seeking news, analysis and enlightenment have more options than ever.

While it may pain them to think of themselves as a (gasp) business, traditional newspapers have tremendous brand equity. As the dynamics of their industry continue to evolve, they can keep watching that equity whither away or take bold steps to remain relevant. “All the news that’s fit to print” is rapidly becoming an anachronism.